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ALGORITHMS, INTERNET PLATFORMS,
AND THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE: A
CRITIQUE OF THE § 512 STUDY
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INTRODUCTION
In 1994, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a
musical group’s parody of a well-known song could be fair use,
which is a noninfringing use of copyrighted content.1 In 2006,
the Second Circuit found that an artist’s use of copyrighted
photographs in his own artwork constituted fair use.2 In 2016,
the Ninth Circuit found that a video of a child dancing to a short
clip of a copyrighted Prince song could be fair use.3 But in 2022,
a creator who attempts to share her fair use of copyrighted
material online may not have recourse to the judicial system to
vindicate her use—in fact, her fair use may never even see the
light of day.
Over the past two decades, the rise of smartphones, social
media, and broadband connections has transformed the Internet
and the ways in which the world uses it to consume
†
Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review, J.D. Candidate, 2022, St.
John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2010, The George Washington University;
MSc, 2011, University of Edinburgh. I would like to thank my Note advisor,
Professor Eva Subotnik, for her invaluable help and guidance, as well as the editors
and staff members of the St. John’s Law Review for their hard work and dedication
during the editorial process. Finally, I would like to thank my parents and my sister
for their constant support and encouragement, especially during these past three
years.
1
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (“Suffice it to say
now that parody has an obvious claim to transformative value . . . . Like less
ostensibly humorous forms of criticism, it can provide social benefit, by shedding
light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one. We thus line up
with the courts that have held that parody, like other comment or criticism, may
claim fair use under § 107.”); see infra text accompanying note 12.
2
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2006).
3
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting
that whether Lenz’s video constituted fair use was a question to be determined by
jury at trial, but not making a dispositive ruling of fair use); see also id. at 1159 n.4
(Smith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Had Universal properly
considered the statutory elements of fair use, there is no doubt that it would have
concluded that Lenz’s use of Let’s Go Crazy was fair.”).
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entertainment, news, and all types of artistic and political
This transformation in technology has led to a
content.4
corresponding rise in the democratization of expression and
creation, as well as access to that creation.5 Online expression
has migrated to platforms that host “user-generated” or “usercreated" content, such as YouTube, Instagram, TikTok, and
SoundCloud; the “openness” of these platforms has led to the
popularity of user-created content that incorporates others’
copyrighted material “as an act of communication and
expression.”6
The rise of these platforms, however, has
concomitantly led to concerns about whether current law—the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”)—can still
sufficiently address the enormous volume of copyrighted material
online, much of which is not authorized use.7 Indeed, several
recent pieces of draft legislation, including the Digital Copyright
Act of 2021 (“DCA”) and, more recently, the SMART Copyright
Act of 2022, have suggested updates to the DMCA.8
The evolution of algorithms has gone hand-in-hand with
these other changes to the digital landscape. While algorithms
are often discussed in many contexts, one context in which they
play an increasingly important role is in the policing of copyright
infringement online.9 Ironically, then, an artist who attempts
today to make a fair use of a copyrighted work and to share it
4

U.S. COPYRIGHT
OF COPYRIGHTS 28–31

OFF., SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER
(2020) [hereinafter U.S. COPYRIGHT REP.].
5
Id. at 75 (citations omitted) (arguing that the Internet “ ‘has fueled a virtuous
cycle of expressive and creative works, and it has democratized access and reach at
scale,’ ” and has “aided the creation of works by providing authors with a variety of
new tools to produce creative content”); see also Pamela Samuelson, Pushing Back
on Stricter Copyright ISP Liability Rules, 27 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 299, 340–42
(2021); Matthew Sag, Internet Safe Harbors and the Transformation of Copyright
Law, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 499, 518 (2017).
6
Sag, supra note 5, at 518.
7
U.S. COPYRIGHT REP., supra note 4, at 10 (“As online activity and third party
uses of creators’ content have increased, so too has the pressure on the notice-andtakedown system’s ability to serve the needs of all stakeholders.”).
8
Thom Tillis, Tillis Releases Landmark Discussion Draft To Reform the Digital
RELEASE
(Dec.
22,
2020),
Millennium
Copyright
Act,
PRESS
https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2020/12/tillis-releases-landmark-discussion-draft-toreform-the-digital-millennium-copyright-act [https://perma.cc/YBZ6-4JGF]; Thom
Tillis, Tillis and Leahy Introduce Bipartisan Legislation to Combat Copyright Theft,
Enhance Content Sharing, and Hold Tech Accountable, PRESS RELEASE (Mar. 18,
2022)
https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2022/3/tillis-and-leahy-introduce-bipartisanlegislation-to-combat-copyright-piracy-enhance-content-sharing-and-hold-techaccountable.
9
See discussion infra Section II.A.

2021]

PROTECTING FAIR USE FROM ALGORITHMS

923

with the world will face greater obstacles than she would have
twenty years ago, despite the advances in technology since then:
algorithms that can detect copyrighted material may prevent the
work from being shared at all or remove the work from the
platform after it is uploaded, and may even preclude the creator’s
access to the judicial system to litigate her claimed fair use.10
This Note argues that the U.S. Copyright Office’s recent
study discussing potential changes to the DMCA statute should
have called for the protection of the fair use doctrine from the
rise of algorithmic technology by: (1) advocating for the
preservation of the current safe harbors and (2) rejecting both
DMCA+ and notice-and-staydown systems as potential Standard
Technical Measures. Part I of this Note provides background
information about the doctrine of fair use and the DMCA in
general. Part II then explores algorithms and their use within
DMCA systems and distinguishes between the traditional DMCA
framework and DMCA+ systems. Part III discusses the recent
Copyright Office Study and note the areas in which it falls short.
Finally, Part IV highlights the potential dangers of implementing
stricter platform liability, DMCA+ systems, or notice-andstaydown systems and instead advocates for legislative and
judicial solutions that preserve the fair use doctrine and users’
freedoms of expression.
I. FAIR USE AND THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
A.

Fair Use in General

Fair use is a doctrine that is rooted in the philosophical
foundations of copyright law. The “ultimate goal” of the U.S.’s
utilitarian philosophy of “copyright is to expand public knowledge
and understanding . . . by giving potential creators exclusive
control over copying of their works, thus giving them a financial
incentive to create informative, intellectually enriching works for
public consumption.”11 A copyrighted work, however, may be
reproduced for a “fair use,” which is not considered an

10

See discussion infra Section II.C.
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 212 (2d Cir. 2015). The court
emphasized that this goal is “clearly reflected in the Constitution’s empowerment of
Congress ‘To promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited Times to
Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings.’ ” Id. (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
11
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infringement12 Fair use is a famously flexible doctrine that seeks
to “protect[ ] th[ese] incentives of authors to create for the public
good” while simultaneously attempting “to define the boundary
limit of the original author’s exclusive rights in order to best
serve the overall objectives of the copyright law to expand public
learning.”13 The Second Circuit has referred to fair use as “the
most troublesome [issue] in the whole law of copyright.”14 Others
have described it as “the jewel in the crown of American
copyright law.”15 Only a few other countries enjoy such a broad
doctrine.16
The doctrine is codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107, which lays out
four factors to help courts determine whether a use of
copyrighted material is a fair use:17
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.18

Courts have cautioned, however, that a fair use analysis
should not include “conventional statutory interpretation” or be
treated like a “checklist,”19 and they have emphasized that fair
use should not be evaluated “mechanistically.”20 Under this
analysis, courts have found many different types of activity to be
fair use, including song parodies,21 artwork that incorporates
12
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984) (a
person “who makes a fair use of the work is not an infringer of the copyright with
respect to such use”).
13
Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 213.
14
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam).
15
Niva Elkin-Koren, Fair Use by Design, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1084 (2017).
16
See Dan L. Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 283, 286 n.14
(2019) (noting that Israel and the Philippines are two countries with provisions
similar to fair use).
17
17 U.S.C. § 107. The doctrine evolved from Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342,
348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901), a case involving a pirated version of a collection
of George Washington’s correspondence. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 576 (1994).
18
17 U.S.C. § 107.
19
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1284 (11th Cir. 2014)
(Vinson, J., specially concurring). Judge Vinson proposed an appropriate analogy for
a doctrine that often deals with artistic and creative works: “in analyzing fair use in
a given case, the court should step back a little, just as you would at an art museum,
and view the work and its use in its entirety.” Id. at 1285.
20
Id. at 1283 (majority opinion).
21
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
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copyrighted material,22 a song by Drake that sampled from
another composition,23 and Google’s digitization of full-length
books.24
Conversely, the Supreme Court has found that
extensively quoting the “heart” of an unpublished manuscript in
a magazine article was not fair use, even if the manuscript was
particularly newsworthy.25
B.

Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998

A much newer body of law, the DMCA, added provisions to
federal copyright law to address the rapidly growing role of the
Internet in the distribution of copyrighted material.26 Of chief
prominence, section 512(c) of DMCA creates a “safe harbor” that
excuses platforms from liability for hosting infringing content, so
long as they follow certain notice and removal procedures.27 The
procedure that the DMCA currently outlines is known as the
notice-and-takedown system: platforms avoid liability for
copyright infringement if, upon receiving a notification from a
copyright holder that the content the platform hosts is infringing,
the platform “expeditiously” removes or disables access to that
content.28
This notification is known as a takedown notice, which must
include identification of both the copyrighted material and the
allegedly infringing material, and “critically, a statement that
the copyright holder believes in good faith the infringing material
‘is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the
law.’ ”29 The platform must also inform its allegedly infringing
user that it has disabled or blocked access to their content.30
That user can then send a “counter notification” to the platform,
which must include a statement of “good faith belief that the
material was removed or disabled as a result of mistake or
22
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698–99 (2d Cir. 2013); Blanch v. Koons, 467
F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2006).
23
See Sam Claflin, Note, How to Get Away with Copyright Infringement: Music
Sampling as Fair Use, 26 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 159, 171–72 (2020); Estate of
Smith v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 3d 737, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff'd
sub nom. Estate of Smith v. Graham, 799 F. App’x 36 (2d Cir. 2020).
24
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 207 (2d Cir. 2015).
25
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559–60, 565
(1985).
26
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1150–51 (9th Cir. 2016).
27
17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
28
Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
29
Lenz, 815 F.3d at 1151.
30
17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1)–(2)(A).
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misidentification.”31 Once the platform receives the counter
notification, the platform must inform the copyright holder and
restore the content within ten to fourteen days—unless, that is,
the platform receives notice that the copyright holder has filed
suit against the user.32
In the seminal Ninth Circuit case Lenz v. Universal Musical
Group, an employee of Universal came across a short video that
Stephanie Lenz had uploaded to YouTube of her children dancing
while the Prince song “Let’s Go Crazy” played in the
background.33 Since Universal held the song’s copyright, the
Universal employee manually sent YouTube a takedown notice,
but, crucially, failed to explicitly consider fair use before doing
so.34 One of the more controversial elements of Lenz’s holding
was the way in which it interpreted the interaction between the
copyright holder’s requirement of a “good faith belief” that the
use is not authorized, found in section 512(c)(3)(A)(v), and the
“knowing misrepresentation” provision, found in section 512(f),
which creates liability for “[a]ny person who knowingly
materially misrepresents . . . that material or activity is
infringing.”35
The Ninth Circuit ruled on both Lenz’s good faith claim
under section 512(c) and her knowing misrepresentation claim
under section 512(f). Ultimately, the court held that copyright
holders must consider fair use in subjective good faith before
sending a takedown notice under section 512(c)(3)(A)(v), and that
Universal would be liable under section 512(f) if it knowingly
misrepresented in its takedown notice that it had determined in
good faith that the allegedly infringing material did not
constitute fair use.36 The court thus denied Universal’s motion
for summary judgment, concluding that “a jury must determine
whether Universal’s actions were sufficient to form a subjective
good faith belief about the video’s fair use or lack thereof”; if not,
Universal would be liable, because its takedown notice would
then have been a knowing misrepresentation.37

31

Id. § 512(g)(3)(C).
Id. § 512(g)(2)(B)–(C).
33
Lenz, 815 F.3d at 1149.
34
Id.
35
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v), (f)(1).
36
Lenz, 815 F.3d at 1155.
37
Id. at 1154. See also Sag, supra note 5, at 531 (“In other words, before issuing
a takedown notice, a rightsholder must at least form a view about whether the
32
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Despite the robust tools that the DMCA notice-andtakedown system features, however, many copyright holders still
do not feel that the system provides them with enough
enforcement power.38 Instead, these copyright holders advocate
for a more restrictive notice-and-staydown system.39 This more
rigid system would implicate privacy and free speech concerns,
since such a system, in ensuring that copyrighted materials stay
off the platform, would automatically scan all content uploaded
to a platform to detect and block any repeated uploads of
copyrighted material.40 In other words, the platform would have
an obligation to continue to block all uploads of the copyrighted
work after receiving a takedown notice—even though subsequent
uploads could potentially be fair uses. This type of system would
become necessary if the DMCA’s safe harbors were altered or
abolished to subject platforms to stricter liability, because
platforms would then have to take proactive steps to avoid
liability by monitoring all uploads for infringing content,
basically employing an “upload filter.”41
This system is
essentially mandated by the European Union’s recent and
controversial Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the
Digital Single Market.42
Because European copyright
“exceptions” are generally much narrower than the U.S.’s fair use

accused work is infringing, and that process includes forming a view as to whether
the accused work is fair use.”).
38
Samuelson, supra note 5, at 302 (noting that “copyright industry groups” have
argued for this change).
39
Id. at 333; see also Elliot Harmon, “Notice-and-Stay-Down” Is Really “FilterFRONTIER
FOUND.
(Jan.
21,
2016),
Everything,”
ELEC.
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/01/notice-and-stay-down-really-filter-everything
[https://perma.cc/4V9V-DQ99].
40
See Harmon, supra note 39.
41
Samuelson, supra note 5, at 329.
42
Id. at 317–19.
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doctrine,43 much of the criticism of Article 17 involves its lack of
flexibility for freedom of expression.44
Finally, one of the “threshold criteria” that a platform must
meet to benefit from the safe harbors is to “accommodate
‘standard technical measures.’ ”45 The statute defines standard
technical measures as the “technical measures that are used by
copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works” that
(1) “have been developed pursuant to a broad consensus of
copyright owners and service providers,” (2) “are available to any
person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms,” and (3) “do
not impose substantial costs on service providers.”46 Currently,
however, there is no consensus as to what those technical
measures are, and whether algorithms—and what type—
qualify.47
II. ALGORITHMS AND DMCA+ SYSTEMS
A.

Algorithms and Their Functions

At its core, an algorithm is simply “a sequence of instructions
telling a computer what to do.”48 Algorithms are used for
43
See Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Towards a European “Fair Use”
Grounded in Freedom of Expression, 35 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1, 3–4, 6–7 (2019).
While the United States’s theory of copyright is utilitarian in nature, and “not an
inevitable, divine, or natural right that confers on authors . . . absolute ownership,”
often known as a moral rights theory of copyright, many European countries (such
as France) do adhere to a moral rights theory. See Pierre N. Leval, Commentary,
Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1107, 1128 (1990). This
difference in copyright philosophy is just one reason why an Article 17-style noticeand-staydown system should be avoided in the United States, with its much more
flexible approach to copyright than many European nations.
44
See Geiger & Izyumenko, supra note 43, at 11 & n.45; see also Michael
Bechtel, Algorithmic Notification and Monetization: Using Youtube’s Content ID
System as a Model for European Union Copyright Reform, 28 MICH. ST. U. COLL. L.
INT’L L. REV. 237, 260–61 (2020).
45
See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation
omitted).
46
17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2); U.S. COPYRIGHT REP., supra note 4, at 176.
47
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 4, at 176; see Letter from Thom Tillis &
Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senators, to Reg. of Copyrights Shira Perlmutter, 1–2 (June 24,
2021),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/6.24.21-Ltr-toUSCO_Senators-Tllis-and-Leahy_re-STMs.pdf (addressing Register Perlmutter in
their respective roles as Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property).
48
Jacob Brogan, What’s the Deal with Algorithms?, SLATE (Feb. 2, 2016, 10:29
AM),
https://slate.com/technology/2016/02/whats-the-deal-with-algorithms.html
[https://perma.cc/ZN3K-LSMV]. The article quotes the definition of algorithm from
The Master Algorithm by Pedro Domingos. Id.
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countless tasks: recommending content on social media
platforms, serving targeted ads, automating stock trading, and
even powering self-driving cars.49 Most of these algorithms are
examples
of
machine-learning
technology,
in
which
“systems . . . rewrite themselves as they work,” based on data
and parameters set by human programmers.50
Algorithms can serve important functions, such as blocking
illegal content, and, therefore, have increasingly been employed
by tech platforms over the past decade.51 Algorithms are also
commonly used to police copyright infringement online, such as
in fingerprinting or content matching systems; these types of
algorithms are employed to identify copyrighted material in useruploaded content, using a database of reference files provided by
the copyright holder.52 But algorithms that are designed to
detect copyrighted materials present many problems, including
identification of different types of “false positives.”53 And one of
the most significant flaws of these copyright algorithms is that
they cannot determine whether a use of copyrighted material
constitutes fair use.54
B.

Algorithms Cannot Determine Fair Use

There are several crucial reasons why algorithms should not
be relied upon to determine fair use questions. First, the
statutory fair use factors, as set out in 17 U.S.C. § 107, are
mostly qualitative, not quantitative, which makes them difficult

49
Id. See also Faiz Siddiqui, What Self-Driving Cars Can’t Recognize May Be a
POST
(Nov.
11,
2019),
Matter
of
Life
and
Death,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/11/11/what-self-driving-cars-cantrecognize-may-be-matter-life-death.
50
Brogan, supra note 48.
51
See Burk, supra note 16, at 284. Some of the best-known algorithms used by
tech platforms include Audible Magic, YouTube’s ContentID, and Facebook’s Rights
Manager. See U.S. COPYRIGHT REP., supra note 4, at 42–46.
52
For example, Audible Magic is an “automatic content recognition”
fingerprinting algorithm used by many platforms, including Facebook, Instagram,
Twitch, and SoundCloud, which boasts that “[t]he list of rightsholders who
proactively register with Audible Magic consists of over 140,000 music labels and
over 1000 video suppliers across the globe. . . . includ[ing] content from industry
leaders.” See 7 Hard but Very Telling Questions for Your Automatic Content
Recognition Vendor (ACR), AUDIBLE MAGIC (Sept. 22, 2020) [hereinafter AUDIBLE
MAGIC],
https://www.audiblemagic.com/2020/09/02/7-hard-but-very-tellingquestions-for-your-automatic-content-recognition-vendor-acr
[https://perma.cc/YHY9-RAZF].
53
Sag, supra note 5, at 544–45.
54
See discussion infra Section II.B.
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to program.55 One analysis concluded that “[a]pplying machine
learning to fair use faces considerable hurdles,” because
programming a machine learning algorithm to detect fair use
would require one to classify examples of fair use—and this
would be challenging, because the “data” of fair use cases is
“noisy,” or “contradictory, vague, and unpredictable.”56 Moreover,
while one could argue that some of the fair use factors could be
automated, such as the amount of the original work used in the
allegedly infringing work or differences in the purposes of the
two works,57 even such straightforward quantitative analysis
would not be foolproof: in some instances, full reproduction of an
entire work is considered fair use, as in photographic depictions
of Barbie58 or the digitization of entire books.59
Second, the fair use inquiry is also context-dependent, and
algorithms, at least in their current state of technology, cannot
understand context.60 Unlike algorithms, “[h]umans can usually
tell if a work is a parody or a critique; they can usually tell if an
excerpt is being used by way of illustration or reference.”61 The
question is whether an algorithm can “stop and think” about a
work in context the way that a human being can; the answer, at
least “for the foreseeable future,” is no.62
Some scholars have attempted to circumvent these obstacles
by arguing that algorithms could be used to at least
“approximate” fair use or make “better,” more efficient, fair use
determinations than humans.63 These fair use determinations,
however, would be made based on non-statutory and
extrajudicial values, or even drawn from user data, rather than
55
See 17 U.S.C. § 107; Stephen McJohn & Ian McJohn, Fair Use and Machine
Learning, 12 NE. U. L. REV. 99, 114–17 (2020).
56
McJohn & McJohn, supra note 55, at 160–61. The authors also noted that
Cambridge University Press v. Patton’s admonition to courts to not apply the
statutory fair use factors mechanically, “[r]ead for everything it’s worth . . . would
bar machine learning assessment of fair use, at least by judges.” Id. at 152.
57
Elkin-Koren, supra note 15, at 1096.
58
See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 804 (9th Cir.
2003).
59
See U.S. COPYRIGHT REP., supra note 4, at 190 n.1004; see also Authors Guild
v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 207 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that digitization of full copies
of copyrighted books was fair use); McJohn & McJohn, supra note 55, at 114–15
(discussing additional cases in which full copies were held to be fair use).
60
Samuelson, supra note 5, at 317–18.
61
Sag, supra note 5, at 531.
62
Id.
63
See Peter K. Yu, Artificial Intelligence, The Law-Machine Interface, and Fair
Use Automation, 72 ALA. L. REV. 187, 212 (2020).
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the statutory fair use factors that Congress has set forth and that
judges have interpreted.64 It is also not at all evident that
algorithms are more efficient or better decision-makers than
human beings; one particularly illustrative example over the past
several years has been the rise of self-driving automated
vehicles, and along with them, accidents caused by the vehicles’
algorithms inability to detect other vehicles, pedestrians, or
obstacles.65
Another serious danger of relying on algorithms is the
discriminatory effects they can have, either inadvertently or due
to biases built into them by their programmers. Algorithms have
been shown to discriminate on the basis of race, sex, and income
level.66 A recent study found that “algorithms can discriminate
on the basis of a social category, intentionally and
unintentionally, even when they are not explicitly fed social
category data.”67 As one scholar noted, the legal argument that
algorithms are more efficient and objective decision-makers than
humans is “alarming” because “[t]he data [is] always cooked,
before algorithmic processing and certainly during algorithmic
processing,” and thus “[t]he question is never whether the data
[is] biased but rather how, by whom, and for what purposes.”68
These algorithms’ lack of transparency is an additional concern:
as one commentator noted, “[t]he use of privately developed
algorithms by private corporations creates a system of ‘black box
governance’ in which copyright adjudication is carried out by
opaque entities with minimal transparency or accountability.”69

64
For example, Yu proposes drawing upon user data (such as pauses, replays,
and highlights) from platforms like Amazon and Netflix to determine what the most
“significant” part of a work is; while this idea is innovative, the most highlighted or
replayed part of a work does not necessarily correlate to the most significant or
meaningful part. See id. at 218 & n.141.
65
See Siddiqui, supra note 49 (noting that these accidents are sometimes fatal);
see also Katrina Geddes, Meet Your New Overlords: How Digital Platforms Develop
and Sustain Technofeudalism, 43 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 455, 456 (2020).
66
See Claire Cain Miller, When Algorithms Discriminate, N.Y. TIMES (July 9,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/upshot/when-algorithmsdiscriminate.html?searchResultPosition=1.
67
Betsy Anne Williams et al., How Algorithms Discriminate Based on Data They
Lack: Challenges, Solutions, and Policy Implications, 8 J. INFO. POL’Y 78, 88 (2018).
68
Burk, supra note 16, at 295–96.
69
Geddes, supra note 65, at 470 (quotation omitted).
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Differences Between DMCA+ Systems and the Traditional
DMCA Framework

Despite the dangers inherent in the use of algorithms, some
platforms have developed “DMCA+” systems that employ
algorithms not only within the confines of the DMCA, but also
outside the coverage of the statute and extra-statutorily.
DMCA+ systems are “private agreements made in the shadow
of . . . safe harbors.”70 The key differences between DMCA and
DMCA+ frameworks are how, and at what points, DMCA+
systems use such algorithms to “engage,” or not engage, with the
DMCA and its procedures.71
Traditional DMCA takedowns can be manual, in which a
copyright holder, as in Lenz, comes across allegedly infringing
content on a platform and sends a takedown notice.72 Platforms
can also employ some form of algorithmic content recognition
technology to “flag[ ]” a match for copyright holders who must
then provide the platform with a “fingerprint” or “reference” file
of the copyrighted material; copyright holders can also use
algorithms themselves to search for and identify copyrighted
material online, and can even use algorithms to send automated
takedown notices to the platform.73 Under these traditional
systems, despite the use of an algorithm, “once a takedown notice
has been issued, the consequences of a match are [still]
determined by the DMCA.”74 The process that the rightsholder
and the user must follow to resolve the dispute are outlined in
the takedown process under section 512.75

70

Sag, supra note 5, at 500, 544; see also The Difference Between Copyright
Takedowns
and
Content
ID
Claims,
YOUTUBE,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/7002106?hl=en&ref_topic=9282678
[https://perma.cc/C2H3-YAN9] (last visited June 5, 2022) (“Unlike [DMCA]
takedowns, which are defined by law, Content ID is a YouTube system that is made
possible by deals made between YouTube and content partners who have uploaded
material they own to our database.”).
71
Sag, supra note 5, at 543–44 (“The salient difference between DMCA-plus
systems—such as YouTube’s Content ID system—and what came before is not the
technology employed, but the legal architecture in which that technology is
embedded.”).
72
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2016).
73
See Sag, supra note 5, at 543, 545; AUDIBLE MAGIC, supra note 52; U.S.
COPYRIGHT REP., supra note 4, at 33, 155 (noting the fair use concerns implicated by
these automated takedown notices); see also discussion infra Section II.C.2.
74
See Sag, supra note 5, at 543.
75
See discussion supra Section I.B.
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Unlike in traditional DMCA takedowns, however, in DMCA+
systems, algorithms can be used at several different stages
within a system that can easily “sidestep[ ]” the DMCA and its
procedural safeguards for users.76 YouTube’s Content ID is
probably the best-known example of a DMCA+ system. And
while a few other platforms, such as Facebook, employ similar
systems,77 Content ID will serve as an illustrative example of
Content ID detects
how a DMCA+ system functions.78
copyrighted content uploaded to YouTube by users and presents
rightsholders with three choices: (1) block the video, (2) allow the
video to stay online while tracking its viewing data, or
(3) monetize the video—allow it to stay online while sharing in
the YouTube advertising revenue it generates.79
1.

Ex-Ante vs. Ex-Post Enforcement

A DMCA+ system can use an algorithm to block allegedly
infringing material from ever being uploaded to the platform,
without requiring the copyright holder to send a takedown
notice;80 this change shifts copyright enforcement from its
current ex-post standard, meaning after the alleged infringement
has taken place, to an ex-ante standard, “impos[ing]
unwarranted restrictions on non-infringing materials and fair

76

Sag, supra note 5, at 544.
Facebook’s “Rights Manager” features a structure that is very similar to
Content ID, including options such as blocking, monetizing, applying attribution, or
sending a “copyright report” to Facebook. See Copyright, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/1020633957973118/?helpref=hc_fnav
[https://perma.cc/W4LS-HYXV] (last visited June 5, 2022) (under “Rights Manager
and Other Intellectual Property Tool” click the hyperlink “What tools does Facebook
provide to help me protect my intellectual property in my videos?”). Facebook also
uses Audible Magic, in addition to its own Rights Manager system. Id.
78
The Study specifically identifies Facebook’s Rights Manager and YouTube’s
Content ID as DMCA+ systems. U.S. COPYRIGHT REP., supra note 4, at 67 n.355, 153
n.819.
79
How
Content
ID
Works,
YOUTUBE,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en [https://perma.cc/GZM59SP4] (last visited June 5, 2022) (under “Common questions about Content ID” click
the hyperlink “What options are available to copyright owners?”). The uploader may
“sometimes” also have the opportunity to share in the revenue. Id.; see also Using
Content ID, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/3244015?hl=en
[https://perma.cc/7XB8-P8UD] (last visited June 5, 2022).
80
What
Is
a
Content
ID
Claim?, YOUTUBE CREATOR ACAD.,
https://creatoracademy.youtube.com/page/lesson/respond-to-content-id-claims_whatis-a-content-id-claim_list [https://perma.cc/77RS-43TT] (last visited June 5, 2022)
(“Most Content ID claims appear upon upload, but note that they can come at any
time if you use any copyrighted material in your videos.”).
77
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uses of content.”81 It also shifts the burden of policing content
onto the platform, which, with the copyright holder’s
authorization by providing the platform with the “reference copy”
of their copyrighted material and setting their “preferred policy,”
can identify and automatically block the use, rather than the
copyright holder identifying the use and manually sending a
takedown notice.82 Thus, while under the traditional DMCA
framework, sending a counter notification permits a “user to
litigate the issue of the lawfulness of her use,” an algorithm that
blocks that use from even being uploaded “never gets the chance”
to be litigated.83 This shift to ex-ante enforcement may have a
“chilling effect” on the production of fair use content, especially
because so few Content ID claims are actually disputed by users
who may feel “disempowered” to litigate the fair use.84
2.

Avoidance of Fair Use Consideration and Liability for
Misrepresentation

Under a DMCA+ system, the copyright holder does not need
to consider whether the use is infringing or make a good-faith
fair use determination under section 512(c)(3)(A)(v) for the
content to be blocked—whether at the moment of upload or after
the content has already been posted to the platform—because the
rightsholder never has to actually send a takedown notice under
the DMCA to block the content.85 In not requiring a takedown
notice, the DMCA+ system also allows the rightsholder to avoid a
misrepresentation claim under section 512(f). Therefore, such
systems may essentially cut the fair-use determination mandated
by Lenz out of the equation completely,86 especially because
algorithms are incapable of determining fair use.87

81
Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright
Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473, 516 (2016); Elkin-Koren, supra note 15, at
1099.
82
See Using Content ID, supra note 79.
83
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act at 22: What Is It, Why Was It Enacted,
and Where Are we Now?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm.
on Intell. Prop., 106th Cong. 15 (2020) [hereinafter Tushnet Statement] (statement of
Rebecca
Tushnet,
Professor,
Harvard
Law
School),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tushnet%20Testimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc/93WY-NV85] (last visited June 5, 2022).
84
Geddes, supra note 65, at 461, 471.
85
See What Is a Content ID Claim?, supra note 80.
86
See M. Jake Feaver, Note, Correcting Computer Vision: The Case for Real Eyes
After Lenz, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 397, 411–12 (2017) (“How can someone consider fair
use in advance of seeing the result of any Content ID match? Since the video is
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Importantly, the original 2015 Lenz opinion was amended in
2016; in its amended opinion, the court deleted language from its
original opinion “not[ing] . . . that the implementation of
computer algorithms appears to be a valid and good faith middle
ground for processing a plethora of content while still meeting
the DMCA’s requirements to somehow consider fair use.”88 The
amended 2016 opinion also removed additional language that
appeared in the original 2015 opinion, in which the court, citing
an argument made in an amicus brief, had observed that
consideration of fair use may be sufficient if copyright holders
utilize computer programs that automatically identify for
takedown notifications content where: “(1) the video track
matches the video track of a copyrighted work submitted by a
content owner; (2) the audio track matches the audio track of
that same copyrighted work; and (3) nearly the entirety . . . is
comprised of a single copyrighted work.”89

The original opinion then suggested that rightsholders
“could then employ individuals . . . to review the minimal
remaining content a computer program does not cull.”90 This
deleted language is relevant, of course, for the use of algorithms
within DMCA+ systems to identify and block fair use content. It
is also relevant, however, for takedown notices within the
traditional DMCA framework sent by copyright holders using
automated algorithms, because, per Lenz, such notices cannot be
sent without the copyright holder making a good-faith fair use
determination, and algorithms are not able to make this
determination.91
The court’s observation that human review would still be
necessary in some cases speaks to the obvious shortcomings of
algorithms in making such determinations. Moreover, the fact
that “the use of full-length content can sometimes be fair use”
further underscores algorithms’ inability to detect fair use, even

automatically blocked, tracked, or monetized, can the copyright holder ever
satisfactorily discharge its burden?”).
87
See discussion supra Section II.B.
88
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2015), amended
by 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016).
89
Id. (quoting Brief for the Org. for Transformative Works, Public Knowledge &
Int’l Documentary Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee, at 29–30 n.8).
90
Id. at 1135–36.
91
See U.S. COPYRIGHT REP., supra note 4, at 33, 151; see also discussion supra
Sections I.B, II.B.
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when they are able to match identical content.92 Regardless, the
court’s deletion of this language from its original opinion leaves a
“critical question in the wake of Lenz” that is broader than the
intricacies of section 512(c)(3)(A)(v) and section 512(f): whether
copyright holders can use algorithms to determine fair use in the
same way they use them to flag potential infringement.93
3.

Burdensome or Non-Existent Appeal Processes

Additionally, the appeal processes that DMCA+ systems
incorporate can be burdensome and can prevent users from
accessing their right to dispute an infringement accusation under
the DMCA.94 For example, users who receive a Content ID claim
must first file a dispute with the copyright holder, and, if the
copyright holder rejects that dispute, the user can file an
appeal.95 The copyright holder has thirty days to respond at each
stage.96 The copyright holder can file a traditional DMCA
takedown notice at either the dispute or appeal stage, and after
this takedown notice is filed, the user can file a counternotice.97
But, theoretically, a user could be forced to endure sixty days of
this two-level extra-statutory process before she is able to finally
access the procedures of the DMCA, which she can only do once
the copyright holder decides to file a takedown notice.98 The
language on the Content ID website illustrates this system’s
separation from the statute: “If you believe that your video falls
under fair use, you can defend your position through the Content
ID dispute process. . . . Sometimes, you may need to carry that
dispute through the appeal and DMCA counter notification
process.”99
92

U.S. COPYRIGHT REP., supra note 4, at 190 n.1004 (citing Matthew Schruers,
Comput. & Commc’n Indus., Comments at the U.S. Copyright Office Section 512
Public Roundtable, Session 5: Technical Strategies and Solutions (May 3, 2016), in
Transcript of the U.S. Copyright Office Section 512 Public Roundtable, at 84:4–7,
copyright.gov/policy/section512/public-roundtable/transcript_05-03-2016.pdf).
93
Sag, supra note 5, at 531; see also Geddes, supra note 65, at 467.
94
See Geddes, supra note 65, at 464.
95
Dispute
a
Content
ID
Claim,
YOUTUBE,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797454
[https://perma.cc/EJ47-M87P]
(last visited June 5, 2022).
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Frequently Asked Questions About Fair Use, YOUTUBE (emphasis added),
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6396261?hl=en [https://perma.cc/BPT55QMU] (last visited June 5, 2022) (under “Common fair use questions” click the
hyperlink “How does Content ID work with fair use?”). YouTube also seems to
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Although Content ID’s appeals process can be burdensome, it
is noteworthy that this process exists in the first place: for
example, Audible Magic, another major player in the algorithm
technology industry, “does not incorporate complaint and redress
mechanisms at all.”100 It is also important—and alarming—to
note that YouTube contracts with certain “Content ID partners
[to] allow them to override DMCA counternotifications” as well as
the Content ID appeals process.101 YouTube explains, without
any further elaboration, that these contracts “require[ ]
[Youtube] to remove specific videos from the site,” “block specific
videos in certain territories, or prevent specific videos from being
reinstated after a [DMCA] counter notification,” which “may
mean the Content ID appeals and [DMCA] counter notification
processes won’t be available.”102
III. THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE STUDY
Against these significant evolutions in technology over the
past two decades, the U.S. Copyright Office released a study in
May of 2020 entitled “Section 512 of Title 17: A Report of the
Register of Copyrights” (the “Study”).103 Congress held twenty
copyright review hearings over two years,104 and from these
hearings emerged the Study, a 198-page document that attempts
to “look[ ] at the past, evaluate[ ] the present, and identif[y]
important issues, themes, and consideration for next steps.”105
The aim of the Study was to evaluate potential problems with,
and updates to, the DMCA in light of the “[c]hanges in
technology and business models used to create and disseminate

discourage the creation of fair use material in the first place when it adds: “The
easiest way to deal with Content ID claims is to avoid them in the first place. Don’t
use copyrighted material unless it’s essential to your video.” Id.
100
Annemarie Bridy, The Price of Closing the “Value Gap”: How the Music
Industry Hacked EU Copyright Reform, 22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 323, 356 (2020).
101
Tushnet Statement, supra note 83, at 16.
102
Videos Removed or Blocked Due to YouTube’s Contractual Obligations,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/3045545
YOUTUBE,
[https://perma.cc/LRL8-36BV] (last visited June 5, 2022); see Geddes, supra note 65,
at 470.
103
U.S. COPYRIGHT REP., supra note 4.
104
Id. at Acknowledgements. These stakeholders included Viacom, Verizon, and
Amazon; film, music, and publishing industry groups; and individual artists and
authors. See id. at Appendix B.
105
Id. at Acknowledgements. The Study is 198 pages without the appendices,
and the appendices brings the full document to 250 pages. Id.
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copyrighted materials . . . that could not have been imagined in
1998 when the Digital Millennium Copyright Act was passed.”106
One of the main questions the Study sought to address was
whether the safe harbors should be altered to create stricter
liability for platforms.107 Unsurprisingly, many rightsholders
advocate for stricter liability, arguing that it will better protect
their copyrighted material from infringement; platforms seeking
to avoid liability and users who create fair use content, oppose
stricter liability.108 The Study discusses this stricter liability
debate at length and says that the current configuration of the
safe harbors has “increase[d] the burden on rightsholders seeking
to enforce their rights online,” and that the “cumulative effect”
has altered the balance struck by Congress when it passed the
DMCA in 1998.109 The Study concludes that “[t]he Copyright
Office therefore would support a Congressional effort to clarify
select provisions of section 512 in order to restore its original
balance.”110
These “select provisions” include the various
knowledge requirements under different sections of section 512—
including the knowing misrepresentation standard under section
512(f), and the Lenz court’s interpretation of it—as well as the
categories of platforms that are eligible for safe harbor
protection, which the Study recommends narrowing.111
And yet, while the Study focused on these and other
potential changes to the DMCA, fair use is barely mentioned.
The Study also fails to adequately address the dangers to fair use
posed by some of the technological and legislative changes that
the Study contemplates, including use of algorithms, DMCA+
systems, and notice-and-staydown systems.
A.

Dismissive Toward Fair Use and Lenz

Overall, the Study gives short shrift to complex concerns
about fair use.112 In light of the importance of fair use, it is
startling to observe that the Study, which is over 100,000 words
long, mentions the phrase “fair use” only forty-three times.113 Its
106

Id.
Id. at 1–2.
108
Id. at 77. See Samuelson, supra note 5, at 308, 310.
109
U.S. COPYRIGHT REP., supra note 4, at 136.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 2–7, 136.
112
See generally id.
113
Samuelson also notes that the Study is “quite dismissive” in its “treatment of
fair uses.” Samuelson, supra note 5, at 334.
107

2021]

PROTECTING FAIR USE FROM ALGORITHMS

939

longest continuous discussion of fair use spans two pages out of
nearly two hundred.114
Downplaying the importance of the good-faith consideration
of fair use required of rightsholders, the Study, in its
recommendations to Congress, also suggests that the Ninth
Circuit decided Lenz wrongly.115
Interestingly, while this
recommendation is listed at the very start of the Study, the
Study does not actually elaborate on “imputing the good faith
requirement” in the later substantive section of the Study that
discusses Lenz.116 The Study does, however, cite to the United
States’s amicus curiae brief for the Lenz case, which articulates
the argument mentioned in the Study’s recommendation. The
amicus brief argues that the Lenz court’s “analysis . . . contains a
significant legal error” in its holding because if “respondents
failed to consider the fair-use factors before sending their
takedown notice, respondents can be held liable for damages
under Section 512(f) on that basis alone, whether or not the video
actually constituted fair use of the copyrighted work.”117 The
brief also contends that if Lenz’s video “did not actually
constitute fair use, respondents’ statement that the video was
infringing was not a ‘misrepresent[ation],’ whether or not
respondents conducted any fair-use inquiry before sending their
takedown notice.”118
As the Lenz court found, if Universal did not consider fair
use before sending the takedown notice, then it would in effect be
misrepresenting its good-faith belief that the work was
infringing. Without considering fair use, Universal simply could
not have formed that good-faith belief. Indeed, fair use is one of
the most common justifications for the use of copyrighted
material. The brief—and the Study—reverse that logic, however,
arguing that an ultimate finding by a court that the work was
actually infringing would absolve the copyright holder from
failing to consider fair use.119
This argument, rejected by the Lenz court but advocated for
by the Copyright Office, would have serious implications if it

114

U.S. COPYRIGHT REP., supra note 4, at 150–52.
Id. at 5.
116
Id. at 5, 150–52.
117
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20–21, Lenz v. Universal
Music Corp., 2017 WL 1756949 (2017) (No. 16-217).
118
Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
119
Id. at 17–21.
115
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were applied in future cases with similar fact patterns to Lenz
but when copyright holders instead use algorithms to send
takedown notices. If algorithms—which are neither ruled in nor
ruled out by the amended Lenz opinion120—cannot adequately
consider or determine fair use,121 then (1) algorithmic takedown
notices cannot form a “good faith belief” that the material was
infringing; and (2) the rightsholders using those algorithms to
send automated notices would then be liable under section 512(f)
for knowingly misrepresenting the infringing quality of the
content. In effect, these algorithmic takedown notices would be
equivalent to the Universal employee who did not consider fair
use before sending the manual takedown notice.
Therefore, the Lenz holding is a further motivation for some
platforms’ migration to DMCA+ systems, in which content can be
blocked without having to deal with the good-faith belief under
section 512(c) or liability under section 512(f).122 However, after
summarizing the debate over the role of algorithms,123 and noting
that the Lenz opinion “did not speak directly to automated
aspects of monitoring for infringements and sending notices,”124
the Study disapprovingly concludes that Lenz’s “result [is]
placing potential liability on rightsholders who fail to undertake
a fair use inquiry before sending a takedown notes [sic], without
regard to whether or not the material is actually infringing.”125
But applying this recommendation would essentially excuse
rightsholders from considering fair use and would likely result in
the unchecked suppression of fair use content on these platforms,
thus undermining one of the foundational doctrines and
philosophies of U.S. copyright law.126

120

See discussion supra Section II.C.2.
See discussion supra Section II.C.
122
See discussion supra Section II.C.; see also U.S. COPYRIGHT REP., supra note
4, at 151.
123
See U.S. COPYRIGHT REP., supra note 4, at 151–52.
124
Id. at 152. Surprisingly, the Study does not mention that the original Lenz
opinion was amended to remove the discussion of automation—even though it
(incorrectly) cites to the original 2015 opinion in its recommendation. Id. at 5 n.11,
150–52.
125
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
126
See discussion supra Section I.A.
121
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Failure To Acknowledge the Dangers of DMCA+ Systems to
Fair Use and Due Process

The Study also fails to fully acknowledge the dangers that
DMCA+ systems pose to both fair use and users’ access to
statutory procedures.127 The Study’s language describing these
various technologies is not precise, and it is somewhat unclear
when the Study is actually referring to DMCA+ systems. For
example, the Study specifically mentions “fingerprinting”
technology as an approach that might become a “feasible option”
for all platforms to employ—and while systems that use
fingerprinting to identify copyrighted content are not necessarily
DMCA+ systems,128 the Study then goes on to describe
fingerprinting as a Content ID-style DMCA+ system.129
When the Study does clearly discuss DMCA+ systems, such
as Content ID, it fails to highlight the danger to fair use that
these systems pose. Although the Study does briefly note a few
panelists’ concerns about Content ID being unable to “properly
take fair use considerations into account” or “sweep[ing] up” fair
use content, the Study phrases this merely as a potential
“concern” or “argu[ment],” and does not extensively discuss the
system’s potentially detrimental impact on fair use or even state
its agreement with this view.130 But, in a post-Study letter to
Congress, the Copyright Office did briefly note that “[i]ncreased
access to [DMCA+ systems] is not likely to be a silver bullet,
however. Even the most advanced filtering systems result in a
non-negligible number of false positives and cannot identify
whether content is protected by fair use.”131 It is interesting to
note that the Study itself never makes such a direct declaration
that algorithms cannot identify fair use as stated in the postStudy letter; it simply notes the opinion of “some” stakeholders

127

U.S. COPYRIGHT REP., supra note 4, at 44, 189.
Id. at 177–78 (the Study includes “[a]udio fingerprinting systems” in this
category, then, two sentences later, essentially describes Content ID, which is a
more complex DMCA+ system than a simple audio fingerprinting algorithm).
129
Id.
130
Id. at 44, 189.
131
See Letter from Marcia Strong, Acting Register of Copyrights & Dir., U.S.
Copyright Off., to Sen. Thom Tillis & Sen. Patrick Leahy 9 (June 29, 2020),
https://www.copyright.gov/laws/hearings/response-to-may-29-2020-letter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3BKS-9CDU].
128
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who testified to that effect, and often contradicts that testimony
with other stakeholders’ opposing views.132
Similarly, the Study fails to note the dangers to due process
and statutory remedies that DMCA+ systems pose. When
discussing “Extra-Section 512 Processes and Requirements,” the
Study notes that “many participants in the notice-and-takedown
system have adapted their practices to accommodate its
increasing usage since the DMCA’s enactment,” clarifying in a
footnote that it is referring to “the use of automated
identification services by rightsholders and DMCA+ content
management systems, like Google’s Content ID or Facebooks [sic]
Rights Manager, by [platforms].”133 The Study then only focuses
on two problems that DMCA+ systems cause: “(i) the adoption of
additional notification requirements” by some platforms for
copyright holders to use DMCA+ systems, for example,
submitting additional documentation or information about the
alleged infringement, and “(ii) the increasing reliance on webbased submission forms with friction deliberately built into the
process.”134 The Study, however, ignores problems that users face
under these systems, such as the way in which Content ID
potentially removes the user from the DMCA with its appeals
process.135 Intriguingly, the Study even questions whether these
additional requirements for rightsholders under DMCA+ systems
invalidate the safe harbors, but it does not address the additional
burdens a user has to go through to appeal such a dispute, or
whether those burdens invalidate the protection of the safe
harbors.136

132
U.S. COPYRIGHT REP., supra note 4, at 44 (“[U]ser advocacy groups expresse
[sic] concern that the system . . . ‘cannot properly take fair use considerations into
account.’ ” (quotation omitted)); id. at 151–52 (“rejoin[ing]” Verizon’s “assert[ion]”
that it is “impossible” for an algorithm to determine fair use with other stakeholder
testimony that contradicts it); id. at 189 (noting the view of “[m]any opponents” of
notice-and-staydown systems that “technology cannot determine” what “constitutes
fair use,” and that “[s]ome users and online content creators . . . maintain” that
Content ID “sweeps up content they believe makes fair use”).
133
Id. at 152–53, 153 n.819.
134
Id. at 153–54.
135
See discussion supra Section II.C.
136
U.S. COPYRIGHT REP., supra note 4, at 155. This assumes, of course, that the
DMCA+ system in question actually has an appeals process available to the user.
See discussion supra Section III.B.
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Failure To Reject DMCA+ and Notice-and-Staydown Systems
as Standard Technical Measures

In light of the dangers these systems pose to fair use and due
process, it is all the more alarming that the Study seems to
favorably mention DMCA+ systems as an option for potential
Standard Technical Measures.137 In noting that “not a single
technology has been designated a ‘standard technical measure’
under section 512(i),” the Study observes that “some individual
[platforms] have deployed DMCA+ systems,” then—without
criticizing this extra-statutory approach—the Study explains
that “DMCA+ systems allow rightsholders to identify and
potentially remove infringing content without going through the
notice-and-takedown process.
Examples include YouTube’s
Content ID and Facebook’s Rights Manager, both of which are
monetization systems.”138 The Study also refers to fingerprinting
technology as an option that may become “feasible” in the future,
but a close examination of the Study’s discussion of
fingerprinting technology reveals that it really means a DMCA+type system.139
Moreover, the Study does not completely reject the idea of a
notice-and-staydown regime. The Study notes that a staydown
system was the “proposal that has attracted the most attention
both from participants in the Study and from outside
commentators,”140 and that many copyright holders of all sizes
endorsed such a system to help them police infringement of their
work online.141 The Study then summarizes the many negative
consequences that could follow from the adoption of a staydown
system, including “the impact . . . on free expression and speech
interests,” the view of “[m]any opponents . . . that technology
cannot determine whether use of rightsholders’ material included
in uploaded content . . . constitutes fair use,” and the possibility
that “a staydown requirement would turn [platforms] into
‘gatekeepers’ of online speech,” which many users and creators
feel is a role that DMCA+ systems (and specifically Content ID)

137

U.S. COPYRIGHT REP., supra note 4, at 67, 178.
Id. at 67 & n.355 (emphasis added).
139
Id. at 178; see supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text. The Copyright
Office’s post-Study letter to Congress, however, does frame DMCA+ systems in a
more negative light. See Letter from Marcia Strong, supra note 131.
140
U.S. COPYRIGHT REP., supra note 4, at 186.
141
Id. at 187.
138
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already play.142 After noting all these negative consequences,
however, the Study fails to take a stance against adoption of such
a system. The furthest the Study goes is to conclude that a
notice-and-staydown regime “should be adopted, if at all, only
after significant additional study, including of the non-copyright
implications they would raise” and after observation of the effects
of the E.U.’s implementation of Article 17.143
Moreover, in a June 2020 letter to Congress answering
several follow-up questions about the Study—one of which was
simply, “[W]hat does the Copyright Office think of ‘notice and
staydown’?”144 The Copyright Office again answered that “[i]t
may . . . be prudent to wait and see whether the EU ultimately
coalesces around one or two models [of implementing a noticeand-staydown system], and then evaluate the relative success or
failure of those models against the current notice-and-takedown
system in the United States.”145 The letter then went on to
enumerate many of the concerns that a notice-and-staydown
system would entail, before once again concluding that “[t]he
Copyright Office lacks information with respect to many of these
questions,” and that the question “may benefit from further
analysis both within and outside of government.”146
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PROTECT FAIR USE
The Copyright Office’s Study should have explicitly called for
the protection of the doctrine of fair use from the rise of
algorithmic technology by advocating for the preservation of the
current safe harbors and rejecting both DMCA+ and notice-andstaydown systems as potential Standard Technical Measures. In
light of the Copyright Office’s failure to do so, it is important that
Congress be aware of these concerns when considering any
legislative changes to section 512, including its evaluation of the
proposed SMART Copyright Act of 2022. Similarly, courts should
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Register of Copyrights & Dir., U.S. Copyright Off. 2 (May 29, 2020),
https://www.copyright.gov/laws/hearings/response-to-may-29-2020-letter.pdf
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Letter from Marcia Strong, supra note 131, at 18. The fact that Congress
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keep these dangers in mind when considering any future DMCA
litigation involving fair use and the use of algorithms.
A.

No Changes to Safe Harbors

The Study should have recommended that Congress preserve
the safe harbors without making liability for platforms stricter,
due to the importance of the fair use doctrine and the
insufficiency of current algorithmic technology to detect or
determine it.147 Such an approach would have ensured the
neutrality of these platforms without giving them a weighted role
in disputes between rightsholders and would-be fair use content
creators.
Considering the voluminous amount of potentially infringing
content online, which no one could have fully foreseen when the
DMCA was passed in 1998, many argue that liability for
platforms should be stricter because the platforms are in the best
position to police the content, and because they are responsible
for its wide proliferation.148 But stricter platform liability is not
the answer. Implementing stricter liability for platforms would
encourage the platforms to rely on non-transparent algorithms to
make underinclusive determinations of what constitutes fair use,
outside the scope of the doctrine’s statutory and judicial
contours.149
Moreover, stricter liability would likely necessitate some
type of notice-and-staydown system. One only has to look at the
internal contradictions found in the E.U.’s Article 17 to come to
this conclusion: although Article 17 articulates a “no-generalmonitoring” obligation, it also requires platforms to use “high
industry standards” and “best efforts” to make sure that
copyrighted works remain “unavailab[le]” on the platform, which
seems to indicate that these platforms must essentially employ a
notice-and-staydown system.150
Therefore, stricter platform
liability would implicate a host of concerns—not the least of
which is the suppression of fair use material—and, as some in
the E.U. have pointed out, such a notice-and-staydown system
may even violate the European Charter of Fundamental Rights,
147
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given its dire implications for the fundamental right of freedom
of expression.151
B.

No DMCA+ Systems or Notice-and-Staydown for Standard
Technical Measures

The Study also should have rejected both DMCA+ systems
and notice-and-staydown systems as potential Standard
Technical Measures (“STMs”). This is a key issue, and a timely
one, as technical measures have become a major focus of several
recent DMCA revision efforts: virtual stakeholder meetings were
held by Congress in September 2020 to “lay the groundwork for
sustained engagement on STMs”;152 the proposed Digital
Copyright Act of 2021 advocated, among other things, for the
establishment of STMs and for a notice-and-staydown system for
certain types of works;153 and the SMART Copyright Act of 2022
calls for the creation of an entirely separate category of
“designated technical measures” that would specifically “identify,
protect, or manage copyrighted works,” and which would be
selected via a rulemaking process led by the Copyright Office.154
Under this proposed law, “covered” platforms would be required
to use “commercially reasonable efforts” to “accomodate and not
interfere with” these technical measures, which could include
“filtering” and other types of algorithmic technologies, or else face
“actual or statutory damages.”155 In light of its dismissive view of
fair use, discussed supra, giving the Copyright Office the
authority to define these technical measures would pose a serious
risk to this important doctrine.156
The potential for this
151
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legislation, or similar bills, to become law is all the more reason
to emphasize the dangers that DMCA+ and notice-and-staydown
systems, in particular, pose to fair use.
1.

DMCA+ Systems

DMCA+ systems should be rejected as STMs for their
negative impact on both fair use and users’ due process
expectations under the DMCA statute. First, DMCA+ systems
can be deployed in such a way that blocks the majority of fair use
content, even at the point of upload.157 Second, DMCA+ systems
that employ an appeals process, such as Content ID, can burden
a user with delays and additional steps before they can even
access the statutory framework—and that is, of course, if the
DMCA+ system even incorporates an appeals process.158 And
again, while some argue that DMCA+ systems are a pragmatic
solution to the issues with the DMCA that keep all stakeholders
happy, the concern is DMCA+ systems are based in private, nontransparent values, rather than those Congress has set out in the
DMCA or those that safeguard users’ procedural and substantive
rights under the DMCA.159
Of course, platforms are private and governed by their own
terms and conditions; no user has a “right“ to upload content to a
platform.160 But the reality is that tech platforms have so
democratized creative, political, and personal output that these
tech platforms are the default delivery systems for expression
today161—especially for young people, who consume virtually all
media via these platforms, including everything from political
content to artistic works to cultural criticism.162 In many cases,
these types of media depend on the fair use of copyrighted
works.163 And the rise of these platforms’ use of algorithms—
especially DMCA+ systems—endangers access to and creation of
KNOWLEDGE (Apr. 28, 2022), https://publicknowledge.org/not-so-smart-the-smartcopyright-acts-dangerous-approach-to-online-copyright-protection
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157
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these fair uses.164 Using algorithms to enforce these private
policies endangers and suppresses fair use, and deprives the
users, who have driven these platforms’ growth and success,165 of
their statutory and procedural expectations.
2.

Notice-and-Staydown Systems

Notice-and-staydown systems should also be rejected as
STMs for the devastating blow they would deal to fair use
content and the creative, collaborative, and democratic
community that currently exists on these platforms.166 There are
significant privacy and free speech concerns with these
systems.167
For example, to enforce a notice-and-staydown
system, platforms would have to scan all uploaded content to
detect any copyrighted material.168 And equally important, in
filtering out all repeated uploads of a copyrighted work, the
system would likely block the majority of fair use content.169
While the Study ultimately concludes that the United States
should adopt a “wait-and-see” approach to how the E.U.
implements such a system, this type of system is uniquely
unsuited to the United States, with its strong doctrine of fair
use.170 Any potential modernization of the DMCA, including the
SMART Copyright Act, should therefore reject the use of noticeand-staydown systems.
CONCLUSION
As proponents of change to the DMCA and its safe harbors,
such as musician Don Henley, put it, “The DMCA has shown its
age—it is a relic of a MySpace era in a TikTok world.”171 That
much is true—the Internet and the ways we interact with it have
evolved beyond recognition since 1998. Undoubtedly there is
more infringement online today than there was twenty years ago,
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and the rise of algorithms has transformed the way the DMCA
envisioned access to this material and litigation of copyright
enforcement. But there are positive and negative aspects to this
technological evolution: the growth of the democratized Internet
and user-generated content platforms has resulted in more
creation, more speech, and more expression, which often makes
fair use of copyrighted materials, just as artists and
commentators have done, legally under U.S. law, since the
nineteenth century. Therefore, we should look to solutions from
Congress and the courts that preserve this essential and
important doctrine, rather than allowing privately-ordered
algorithms developed by tech platforms to suppress it.

